DEFAMATION-LIBEL-ENGLISH

TRANSLATION OF SPANISH PUB-

LICATION CANNOT BE USED TO ESTABLISH ACTUAL MALICE-

Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc., 833 F.2d 446 (3d
Cir. 1987).
The first amendment guarantees that "Congress shall make
no law. .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."' In
the first half of the twentieth century a prominent writer suggested that pursuing a libel suit was unimportant in a capitalistic
society. The libel suit, however, has experienced unexpected revitalization in the latter half of the twentieth century prompting
the Supreme Court to address the extent to which the Constitution restricts recovery for defamation. 3 It is axiomatic that recovery by a public official would raise particularly poignant
constitutional issues in a nation where criticism of the government is considered a central freedom.4 In 1964, the Supreme
Court determined that a public official's recovery in a libel suit
was predicated on establishing with convincing clarity that the
statement was published with actual malice. 5 Reflecting on an
issue indigenous to a heterogeneous society, the Third Circuit in
Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc.6 held that under the reI U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment in its entirety states that: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." Id.
2 Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REV.
727 (1942). David Riesman analyzed America's disinterest in pursuing libel suits as
follows:
[T]he American attitude towards reputation is unique . . . where tradition is capitalistic rather than feudalistic, reputation is only an asset,
"good will", not an attribute to be sought after for its intrinsic value.
And in the United States these business attitudes have colored social
relations. The law of libel is consequently unimportant.
Id. at 730.
3 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that a public official may recover damages for a defamatory statement only if he proves that
the statement was made with malice). See also Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Reuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1983). The rejuvenation of
libel law can be attributed to the Court's recognition of recovery for purely emotional injury, the trend toward favoring compensation and risk allocation, the difficulty in separating the entertainment and informative functions of the media and
the lack of coherent standards in libel law. Id. at 11.
4

See generally R.

LABUNSKI, LIBEL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

(1987) (discussing

the role of libel laws in a society which promotes freedom of expression).
5 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-280.
6 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987). The appeal was brought before Chief Judge
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quirement of establishing actual malice, a published statement
must be evaluated in its original language and not by its English
translation.7
Dunn involved a Spanish language daily newspaper entitled
El Diario-La Prensa (El Diario) which covered a statement by

Thomas G. Dunn, Mayor of Elizabeth, New Jersey.' During a
campaign debate, Mayor Dunn attributed the city's litter problem
to the number of new inhabitants who had arrived from impoverished countries and were unaccustomed to their new environment. 9 In response to Mayor Dunn's statement, the October 23,
1984 edition of El Diario printed the following front page headline for its Spanish readership: "Alcalde de Elizabeth al ataque:
LLAMA 'CERDOS'A LOS HISPANOS."'° The English translation

of the headline read: "Elizabeth Mayor on the attack: CALLS
HISPANICS 'PIGS.' "' In addition, on October 28, 1984, El
Diario published an open letter from Manuel de Dios Unanue, its
Editor-in-Chief, to Mayor Dunn alleging that Mayor Dunn had
concealed embezzlement within the city government and had di2
rected city officials not to speak with El Diario representatives.
Gibbons, Circuit Judges Aldisert and Mansmann. Id. at 447. Judge Aldisert authored the unanimous opinion of the court. Id.
7 Id. at 452.
8 Id. at 448.
9 Id. Mayor Dunn stated that:
[L]itter, of course, is an ever growing problem because we are a very
busy, a growing city. And you know our public work employees do not
go around deliberately filling the curbs up with debris. People, people
make debris. And we're constantly trying to educate people to the fact
that if they want a clean downtown they're going to have to do their part
to keep it clean. You have a lot of new people moving into the City of
Elizabeth, some coming from foreign lands where abject poverty was
something they lived with everyday and they have not yet been assimilated into our type of society, and it will take a great deal of time for
some of them to respect the rights and the properties of other people,
and above all, to respect a city that offers them a home in what I consider to be a wholesome environment.
Id.
10 Id.
I I d.
12 Id. at 448, 452. As translated, the segments of the October 28th El Diario
open letter stated:
Again Mr. Mayor? In all of my career as a newspaperman, I have
never encountered a politician who has committed so many mistakes
and demonstrated such little sensitivity toward the people he supposedly represents.
We do not doubt any of our personnel. Can you say the same?
What happened with the $687,000 which the federal Department of
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Mayor Dunn filed a complaint against Gannett New York
Newspapers, Inc. (Gannett), publishers of El Diario, asserting that
the October 23, 1984 headline and segments of the October 28,
1984 open letter were defamatory. 13 On May 1, 1986, the United
States District Court for the District of NewJersey, applying New
Jersey law, granted Gannett's motion to dismiss the action regarding the October 28th open letter. 1 4 The district court, however, denied Gannett's motion to dismiss the complaint as to the
October 23rd headline.' 5
The district court subsequently granted Gannett's motion
for reargument and on September 16, 1986, vacated its earlier
opinion denying summary judgment to dismiss the claim as to
the October 23rd headline. 16 Holding that Mayor Dunn had
failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
headline was published with actual malice, the district court
granted Gannett's motion to dismiss.' 7 The district court, however, denied Mayor Dunn's motion for reconsideration and his
request to supplement the record.' 8 Mayor Dunn appealed from
the district court's decision granting summary judgment and denying record supplementation.' 9 The Third Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision, holding that actual malice cannot be established by an English translation of a Spanish publication.2 °
The United States Supreme Court initially addressed the extent to which the first amendment restricts the states' authority to
award damages in a libel suit in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.2 '
Housing discovered had been lost and the report which you had asked
the City Council to keep confidential?
But there is also something which I cannot ignore and that is your
order to municipal employees not to talk with the reporters of El DiarioLaPrensa. That again brings back memories of Adolf Hitler or the censorship prevalent in totalitarian regimes like those of Fidel Castro.
Id. at 453-54.
13 Id. at 448.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 448-49.
17 Id. at 449. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (clear
and convincing evidence standard must be employed in summary judgment motions). For a more detailed discussion of Anderson see infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
18 Dunn, 833 F.2d at 449.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 452.
21 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Supreme Court has held that libelous speech is an
unprotected class. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 & n.10
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In New York Times, L.B. Sullivan, an elected commissioner in
Montgomery, Alabama, alleged that a full-page advertisement
published in the New York Times contained statements which were
defamatory to him in his official capacity.2 2 The advertisement,
published during the civil rights movement, alleged incidents of
police suppression in Montgomery, Alabama.2 3 The Supreme
Court of Alabama awarded Sullivan $500,000 in damages concluding that under Alabama law the advertisement was libelous
per se. 24 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and
remanded the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama. finding
Alabama's libel law constitutionally deficient. 2 5 The unanimous
Court in New York Times concluded that statements concerning
the official conduct of an elected government employee 26 could
only support an action for libel if the plaintiff established by clear
and convincing evidence 27 that the statements were published
(1961); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48 (1961); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348-49 (1946); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
See generally PROSSER AND KEETON, LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 804-12 (5th ed.
1984) (discussing the current law of defamation).
22 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256.
23 Id. at 257-58. The advertisement was entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices"
and included allegations that students attending Alabama State College protested
to state authorities by not registering for classes and signing "My Country, 'Tis of
Thee" on the steps of the state capital. Id. at 256-57. It was also alleged that Dr.
Martin Luther King's home was bombed and that he had been arrested seven times
for offenses including loitering, speeding and perjury. Id. at 257-58.
24 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 659, 680, 144 So.2d 25, 28, 52
(1962), rev'd and remanded, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Although the advertisement did
not specifically mention Sullivan, he asserted that because he was the Commissioner responsible for supervision of the Montgomery Police Department, any allegations of wrongdoings by that department would implicate him. 273 Ala. at 670,
144 So.2d at 39. In Alabama a plaintiff could establish that a published statement
was libelous per se by showing that "the words published tend to injure a person
libeled by them in his reputation, profession, trade or business, or charge him with
an indictable offense, or tends to bring the individual into public contempt." Id. at
668, 144 So.2d at 37.
25 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 264.
26 Id. at 279. First amendment protections of speech were extended to nonelected public officials in Rosenblatt v. Blair, 383 U.S. 75 (1965). Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, stated that "[tihere is, first, a strong interest in debate on
public issues, and, second, a strong interest in debate about those persons who are
in a position significantly to influence the resolution of those issues." Rosenblatt,
383 U.S. at 85.
27 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86. The Supreme Court summarized the
three standards of proof in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). In typical
civil cases involving monetary disputes, a plaintiff must establish his or her position
by a preponderance of the evidence, the lowest evidentiary standard. Addington,
441 U.S. at 423. In criminal cases, however, guilt must be proved beyond a reason-
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with actual malice.2 8 In proving actual malice, the Court stated
that the plaintiff must establish that the defendant published the
statement while knowing its falsity or with reckless disregard of
the truth. 29 The Supreme Court considered its decision necessary to protect first amendment freedoms of speech and of the
press which safeguard uninhibited and robust debates on public
30
issues.
Three years later, the Supreme Court consolidated Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts3 and Associated Press v. Walker, 3 2 and extended first amendment protections of speech to criticism of
public figures. 3 3 Curtis involved the Saturday Evening Post's accusation that University of Georgia athletic director, Wally Butts, had
disclosed the football team's offensive and defensive patterns to
the opposing team's coach.3 4 In Walker, the Associated Press was
alleged to have mischaracterized former Major General Edwin
Walker's participation in a riot on September 30, 1962 at the
University of Mississippi. 35 Neither Butts nor retired Major
Walker were government employees for the purposes of the New
York Times requirement. 36 The Supreme Court concluded that a
public figure could only recover for an injurious and defamatory
falsehood on evidence that the publisher was engaged in unreaable doubt, thereby protecting the defendant and imposing the entire risk of error
on the state. Id. at 423-24 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). In civil
cases where interests are more substantial than monetary loss alone, an intermediate standard requiring clear and convincing evidence has been employed. Id. at
424.
28 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. The Supreme Court cited with approval
Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908) which held that the freedom
to make good-faith statements about issues of public concern was essential to the
welfare of the nation. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280-82 (citing Coleman v.
MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 720, 98 P. 281, 286 (1908)).
29 Id. at 280.
30 Id. at 270. The Supreme Court decided New York Times "against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials." Id. (citations omitted).
31 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965), aff'd, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
32 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
33 Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 155.
34 Id. at 135-36.
35 Id. at 140. Major General Walker was reported to have encouraged rioters to
use violence and was also reported to be instructing rioters in techniques to combat
the effect of tear gas. Id.
36 Id. at 154. Although the University of Georgia is a state university, a private
corporation employed Butts. Id. at 135.
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sonable conduct. 7
The Supreme Court was compelled to re-examine the New
York Times actual malice requirement in St. Amant v. Thompson,3 8

where a public official established that false information had been
broadcasted recklessly but without the defendant having actual
knowledge of its falsity.3 9 Adopting a subjective standard, the St.

Amant Court concluded that reckless disregard is limited to circumstances where the defendant had, in fact, doubted the validity
of the statement. 40 Focusing on whether the defendant had en37

Id. at 155. The Supreme Court enunciated its opinion as follows:
We consider and would hold that a "public figure" who is not a public
official may also recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose
substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure
from the standard of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to
by responsible publishers.

Id.
The Court subsequently offered a definition of a public figure in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). The Court identified two ways of establishing a person's status as a public figure:
For the most part those who attain [the] status [of a public figure] have
assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some
occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are
deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed
as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular
public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment.
Id. For an example of the Court's analysis of the public figure requirement, see
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (evidence that petitioner
had lived 20 years in relative obscurity following a grand jury inquiry and criminal
sentence precluded petitioner's classification as a public figure); Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (director of a non-profit research facility was not a
public figure by virtue of his application for a federal grant); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (wealthy socialite was not a public figure by her involvement in divorce proceeding); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)
(attorney involved in controversial civil trial was not a public figure). But see Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine For Men, 754 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 864 (1985) (attorney's voluntary association with motorcycle gangs who were
the subject of media attention rendered the attorney a public figure as to allegations of drug trafficking).
38 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
39 Id. at 730.
40 Id. at 731. The Supreme Court had previously considered the reckless disregard standard concluding that even words spoken in hatred were protected under
the actual malice requirement if the speaker honestly believed the statement was
valuable in the free exchange of ideas and the search for truth. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964). But see St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 734 (Fortas, J.,
dissenting):
The First Amendment does not require that we license shotgun attacks
on public officials in virtually unlimited open season. The occupation of
public officeholder does not forfeit one's membership in the human
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tertained serious doubts as to the information's truth, the
Supreme Court discounted the defendant's failure to verify his
information. 4
The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. ,42 further expanded first amendment protections of
speech. Rosenbloom involved news broadcasts of a bookseller's
arrest for possession of obscene literature.43 After Rosenbloom
was acquitted of criminal obscenity charges, he filed suit against
Metromedia alleging that broadcasts which did not specifically
name him but characterized him as a "girlie-book peddler[ ]" and
"smut distributor" were defamatory.4 4 The Supreme Court concluded that the journalists were entitled to first amendment protections of speech when covering private citizens involved in
matters of public interest, and therefore, the New York Times actual malice requirement was applicable.4 5
After a period of continued expansion of first amendment
protections of speech, the Supreme Court reexamined a private
individual's right to bring a suit for defamation in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.4 6 Gertz was a reputable attorney who represented a
victim's family in a civil action against a police officer convicted of
murder. 4 7 The defendant's magazine alleged that Gertz had arranged the "frame-up" of the police officer and was a "Communist-fronter" with a criminal record. 48 The Supreme Court
race. The public official should be subject to severe scrutiny and to free
and open criticism. But if he is needlessly, heedlessly, falsely accused of
crime, he should have a remedy in law. New York Times does not preclude this minimal standard of civilized living.

-

Id.
Id. at 731.
403 U.S. 29 (1971).
43 Id. at 33-34.
44 Id. at 36.
45 Id. at 52. See generally Note, Defining a Public Controversy in the ConstitutionalLaw
of Defamation, 69 VA. L. REV. 931 (1983) (an analysis of various states' definitions of
a public controversy). New Jersey has recognized matters of public interest as including persons who "voluntarily and knowingly engage[] in conduct that one in
his position should reasonably know would implicate a legitimate public interest,
engendering the real possibility of public attention and scrutiny." Sisler v. Gannett
Co., 104 N.J. 256, 274, 516 A.2d 1083, 1092 (1986).
46 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
47 Id. at 325.
48 Id. at 325-26. The defendant published American Opinion, a monthly magazine,
which espoused the views of the John Birch Society. Id. In the 1960s, American
Opinion warned of a conspiracy to discredit the police force and replace the policemen with Communist supporters. Id. The article which asserted Robert Gertz's
participation in framing a police officer for murder was part of this series on the
Communist conspiracy to discredit the police force. Id.
41

42

1989]

NOTE

761

concluded that Gertz was neither a public official nor a public
figure by virtue of his role in the civil trial, and therefore, the New
York Times standard was not applicable.49 The Supreme Court
left to the states the determination of appropriate standards for a
private individual's recovery for defamation. 50
Recently, in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.5" the Supreme

Court considered the appropriate summary judgment standard
for those cases where the New York Times requirements are applicable.52 In Anderson, the publisher of The Investigatorsubmitted an
affidavit stating that the article in question was fully researched
and compiled from a number of sources.53 Moving for summary
judgment, the publisher argued that a finding of malice was precluded. 54 The Supreme Court concluded that the New York Times
clear and convincing evidentiary standard must be used to determine whether a genuine issue remains for trial.55 The Court further stated that a properly supported motion for summary
judgment may only be defeated when an opposing party has
presented sufficient evidence to support a judgment in his
favor. 56
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
was faced with a unique question of defamation law in Dunn v.
Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc.5 7 In determining whether a

statement referring to a public figure's official conduct constituted actionable libel, the Third Circuit was required to decide
49
50

Id.

at

352.

Id. at 347. Furthermore, the Court mandated that recovery of punitive damages is precluded unless actual malice is proven. Id. at 349.
51 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
52 Id. at 244.
53 Id. at 245.
54 Id. In federal court, summary judgment is granted according to FED. R. Civ.
P. 56. Rule 56(a) specifies that:
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or
to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of
20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor upon
all or any part thereof.
Id.
55 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255-56. The Supreme Court had previously discussed
the requirement of providing a genuine issue to block an adversary's motion for
summary judgment in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith, 475 U.S. 574 (1986),
where the Supreme Court noted that a motion cannot be blocked simply by alleging that there is some doubt to the opponent's argument. Id. at 586.
56 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.
57 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987).
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whether the published Spanish word or the word's English translation should be used to establish actual malice.58 Judge Aldisert
began his analysis by reviewing the principles of summary judgment noting that the judge's function in a summary judgment
is to determine whether a genuine issue exists for
proceeding
59
trial.
Considering whether summary judgment was appropriate,6 0
the court noted that it must first determine whether El Diario had
damaged Mayor Dunn's reputation within the meaning of New
Jersey law and, if he were harmed, whether the first amendment
precluded recovery. 6 Judge Aldisert noted that, under New
Jersey law,6 2 published material which injures a person's reputation is subject to liability only when the statement is false 63 and
simultaneously indicates an assertion of fact. 6' After these elements are established, the court noted that the issue becomes
whether the statement is susceptible to defamatory meaning.6 5
Judge Aldisert observed that it is the court's and not the
factfinder's function to determine if the statement is patently defamatory by its subjection of an individual to ridicule, hatred or
contempt. 6 6 The court further stated that in situations where the
58

Id. at 447-48.

59 Id. at 449.
60 Id. Judge Aldisert

noted that "[slummary judgment can be granted only if no
genuine issue of material fact exists." Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Goodman v.
Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038
(1977)). A genuine issue was further defined by Judge Aldisert as evidence which
would persuade a reasonable jury in finding for the non-moving party. Id. (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)).
61 Id. (citing Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1077
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); Steaks Unltd., Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d
264, 270 (3d Cir. 1980)). New Jersey tends to favor granting summary judgment to
media libel defendants. See Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104 N.J.
125, 157, 516 A.2d 220, 236 (1986).
62 In some areas, New Jersey has extended greater protection of free speech
than is required by the federal Constitution. State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 555, 423
A.2d 615, 625 (1980), appeal dismissed sub nom. Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S.
100 (1982). See alo Maressa v. NewJersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 445 A.2d 376, cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982) (In a libel action, New Jersey Shield Law grants newspersons absolute privilege to withhold confidential sources which relate to the editor's thought processes.).
63 Dunn, 833 F.2d at 449 (citing Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176,
190, 445 A.2d 376, 383-84, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982)).
64 Id. (citing Karnell v. Campbell, 206 N.J. Super. 81, 89, 501 A.2d 1029, 1033
(App. Div. 1985)).
65 Id. (citing Kotlikoff v. The Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 66, 444 A.2d 1086,
1088 (1982)).
66 Id. (citing Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & Printing, Ltd., 89 N.J. 451, 459,
446 A.2d 469, 473, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982)).
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statement is capable of defamatory and nondefamatory interpretation, the question of whether the statement is actionable must
be decided by a jury. 67 Reviewing the instant matter, Judge Aldisert adopted the district court's determination that the October
23rd headline was actionable.68
Addressing the question of whether first amendment protections barred Mayor Dunn's recovery, Judge Aldisert stated that
public issues should be uninhibitedly debated under circumstances which occasionally include sharp attacks on government
officials. 69 The court of appeals further noted that a public official's recovery for defamation regarding official conduct is predicated on establishing with convincing clarity that the statement
was published with actual malice which is defined as knowledge
that the statement is false or a reckless disregard of the truth.7y
The court further defined reckless disregard as the publisher's
awareness of the statement's inaccuracy at the time of the
publication. 7 '
Determining the quantum of malice that must be demonstrated for a successful summary judgment motion, the court observed that it must support a jury's finding that there was or was
not clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. 72 Judge Aldisert further stated that when the issue of actual malice is raised
on appeal, the court must examine the record to assure that the
judgment 7 did
not impair the defendant's right of free
3
expression.

The court of appeals affirmed the district court's determination that New York Times was applicable to Mayor Dunn's official
conduct." Reviewing the allegations raised by Mayor Dunn to
67 Id. (citing Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & Printing, Ltd., 89 N.J. 451, 459,
446 A.2d 469, 473, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982)).
68 Id. at 450.
69 Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
70 Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)).
71 Id. (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)). See also Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (a publisher
could not be held liable for an article which incorrectly evaluated loudspeaker system); Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broadcasting & Cable Inc., 780 F.2d 340, 342 (3d
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1187 (1986) (malice could not be established by
evidence that publisher relied on biased sources and failed to properly investigate
story).
72 Dunn, 833 F.2d at 450 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986)).
73 Id. (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States Inc., 466 U.S.
485, 499 (1984)).
74

Id.
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illustrate the existence of actual malice, Judge Aldisert compared
the headline to Mayor Dunn's actual statements from the debate.7 5 Specifically, Mayor Dunn asserted that the denotation of
cerdos with single quotation marks conveyed to El Diario's readers
that Mayor Dunn had used the word "pigs" in his speech. 6 In
support of that proposition, Mayor Dunn offered the deposition
testimony of Antonio Santurio, an assistant metropolitan editor
of El Diario, to establish that Santurio knew at the time the headspecifically reline was published that Mayor Dunn had neither
77
ferred to Hispanics nor used the word "pig."
The court of appeals also considered the statement of Jose
Rohaidy, who wrote the article which accompanied the October
23rd headline. 78 Rohaidy based the article on reports received
from Manuel Goberna and Juan Sierra who attended the campaign debate. 79 In his affidavit, Manuel Goberna stated that he
understood Mayor Dunn's statement to refer to Hispanics and,
although "pigs" was not used in the debate, the effect was identical. 8 ' The court also noted that Juan Sierra and another individual present at the debate concurred with Goberna's assessment
of Mayor Dunn's statement and the reaction it caused. 8 '
The court of appeals referred to Santurio's affidavit, which
explained that the editorial staff decided to use the word cerdos,
because there was no Spanish equivalent for the English word
"litterbug" and alternative Spanish words were too inflammatory
or vulgar.8 2 Judge Aldisert noted the import of the editor's assertion that the staff chose cerdos because it is used in Spanish to
refer to individuals who dirty the street by littering.8 3 The court
also considered Antonio Santurio's explanation that the quotation marks were placed around cerdos to indicate its figurative
75

Id.

76 Id.

77 Id.at 450-51.

Id. at 451.
Id. In circumstances such as these, the Third Circuit has identified the "operative inquiry" as being "whether he published the statement even though he 'in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.' " Pierce v. Capital
Cities Comm., Inc., 576 F.2d 495, 508 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 861 (1978)
(footnote omitted).
80 Dunn, 833 F.2d at 451. Sierra stated in his affidavit that he believed Mayor
Dunn's remarks to refer to Hispanics and that he also believed the article correctly
reflected the Hispanic community's frustration and anger with Mayor Dunn's accusation. Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
78
79
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use.8 4 Recognizing that the use of quotation marks in the Spanish language does not uniformly signify a literal quotation, the
court considered Santurio's representation that the headline was
neither perceived by the Spanish readership nor intended by its
authors to convey a direct quotation of Mayor Dunn's words.8 5
Judge Aldisert concluded that the evidence persuasively illustrated that El Diario formulated the October 23rd headline
from numerous sources who believed that Mayor Dunn's statement referred to Hispanics. 6 The court stated that Mayor Dunn
failed to demonstrate that El Diario questioned the accuracy of its
sources and further mentioned that Mayor Dunn failed to successfully challenge the use of cerdos as an accurate reflection of his
statements as translated into Spanish. 7 - Judge Aldisert did not
accept Mayor Dunn's contention that the use of cerdos was inappropriate because one of its English translations is "pig." 8 8
The court declared that the determination of actual malice
must be made from the original word used by the defendant and
not by its English translation."' In so doing, the court indicated
that translations may not reflect the nuances and subtleties contained in the original statement. 9 ° The court observed that this
concern was particularly evident in the instant matter where
there exists no Spanish translation for the word "litterbug."'"
Judge Aldisert determined that while El Diario may have mischaracterized Mayor Dunn's statements, such mischaracterization
would not be sufficient to establish actual malice under the New
York Times standard.9 2 Noting that the Spanish word cerdos was a
Id.
85 Id.
84

Santurio stated that the headline "was not intended to convey, nor do I

believe that our Spanish-speaking readership interpreted it to convey, that Dunn
was being directly quoted." Id. (citation omitted).
86 Id. According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A, comment f, at
237 (1977), slight inaccuracies are not actionable if the substance of the statement
is accurate. See also Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1226 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that there is no constitutional privilege to neutral reportage).
87 Dunn, 833 F.2d at 451-52.
88 Id. at 452. Judge Aldisert considered Mayor Dunn's strongest argument to be
the difference between the English word that he actually used and the English
translation of the Spanish word which was published. Id.
89 Id. See also Jenkins v. KYW Westinghouse Broadcasting & Cable, Inc., 829
F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1987), where the Third Circuit considered an English statement's
possible defamatory meaning under Pennsylvania law and noted the difficulty in
perceiving the broadcast as it was interpreted by the viewing public. Id. at 406-07.
90 Dunn, 833 F.2d at 452.
91 Id.

92 Id. See also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States Inc., 466 U.S.
485, 512-13 (1984) (an unintentional malapropism is protected speech under the
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fair, though inadequate, translation of litterbug, the court concluded that Mayor Dunn failed to present any countervailing evidence of actual malice which could raise a genuine issue of
material fact. 9 3
The court of appeals next considered the cause of action
concerning the October 28th open letter authored by Manuel de
Dios Unanue, Editor-in-Chief of El Diario.9 The court recognized that expressions of opinions would not be actionable for
libel unless there was reliance on undisclosed defamatory facts.9 5
Judge Aldisert continued his analysis by distinguishing between
pure opinions and mixed opinions, noting that the former occurs
when the author does not explicitly disclose the facts on which
9 6
the opinion is based, but the parties assume the facts exist.
Considering the applicable New Jersey law, Judge Aldisert noted
that expressions of pure opinion regarding issues of public concern may not support an action for defamation. 9 v The court further noted that mixed opinions, based on undisclosed facts, may
be actionable if the underlying and undisclosed facts are defamatory. 98 Judge Aldisert predicted that the Supreme Court of New
Jersey would have advocated the foregoing approach in deciding
whether the October 28th open letter constituted defamation. 9
first amendment, even though an informed reader would have known the term was
inaccurate in the context in which it was used); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279
(1971) (inaccurate interpretation is not sufficient to establish ajury question under
the actual malice requirement).
93 Dunn, 833 F.2d at 452.
94 Id. The Third Circuit noted that New Jersey uses the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 566 (1977) to determine whether an opinion constitutes defamation.
See Kotlikoffv. Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 69, 444 A.2d 1086, 1089 (1982). See
also Karnell v. Campbell, 206 N.J. Super. 81, 89, 501 A.2d 1029, 1033 (App. Div.
1985) ("The question of whether the statement has a defamatory meaning does not
even arise, however, unless the statement is an assertion or implication of 'fact.' ").
95 Dunn, 833 F.2d at 453. Section 566 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
(1977) provides that "[a] defamatory communication may consist of a statement in
the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies
the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion." See also
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), where Justice Powell stated in
dicta that "[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience ofjudges and juries but on the competition of other ideas." Id. at 33940 (footnote omitted).
96 Dunn, 833 F.2d at 453. The terms pure and mixed opinions and the court's
discussion thereof were extracted from the comments to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977).
97 Dunn, 833 F.2d at 453 (quoting Kotlikoffv. Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 6970, 444 A.2d 1086, 1089-1090 (1982)).
98 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977)).
99 Id.
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The court of appeals considered the paragraphs in the October 28th open letter which accused Mayor Dunn of embezzlement, concealing misconduct and restricting city employees'
right to free speech.' 0 0 Judge Aldisert compared this case to a
prior Supreme Court decision where a statement alleging that a
local developer was blackmailing the city was not actionable because it was obvious that the term was a rhetorical hyperbole.' 0 '
The court also examined a New Jersey Supreme Court decision
where a letter to the editor making allegations of a "conspiracy"
and a "huge cover-up" were protected opinions when examined
0 2
in the full context of the document.'
Judge Aldisert stressed that the October 28th open letter
was based on fully disclosed facts including references to
$687,000 in missing funds and Mayor Dunn's directive that municipal employees not speak to El Diario reporters. 0 3 The court
determined that opinions which include underlying non-defamatory facts cannot support an action for defamation regardless of
how derogatory the statements may be.'0 4 The court considered
this rule justifiable due to the readers' ability to assess for themselves the validity of the author's opinion against the disclosed
facts.'0 5 The court concluded that the contested paragraphs contained in the October 28th open letter were protected as expressions of pure opinion. 106 Relying on the loose and figurative
language of the letter, the court determined that the statements
could not have been interpreted as accusing Mayor Dunn of committing a criminal offense. 0 7
Additionally, the court of appeals concluded that the October 28th open letter's comparison of Mayor Dunn to notorious
100 Id. at 453-54.
101 Id. at 454 (citing Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6
(1970)).
102 Id. (citing Kotlikoffv. Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 444 A.2d 1086 (1982)).
103 Id.
104 Id. (quoting Kotlikoff v. Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 73, 444 A.2d 1086,
1091 (1982)).
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. The court reasoned that the first amendment protects "pure" opinion. See
Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S.
264, 284 (1974) (publication of "traitor" in commentary on union negotiations
could not be interpreted as representation of fact, as the word was clearly used in
loose, figurative sense). But see Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54,
64 (2d Cir. 1980) (article alleging specific charges of rape and obstruction ofjustice
was capable of defamatory meaning).
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dictators is protected under the first amendment." 8 The court
characterized the open letter as no greater than an imaginative
expression of contempt and ruled that the district court was correct in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment as to
the October 28th open letter. 10 9
The court of appeals proceeded to review the district court's
denial of Mayor Dunn's motion for reconsideration and request
to supplement the record." 0 Applying an abuse of discretion
standard, Judge Aldisert noted that Gannett's motion for summary judgment could only have been successfully blocked by
clear and convincing evidence of actual malice."' The court concluded that Mayor Dunn was not entitled to supplement the record to address the impact of the recently decided Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc. 112 as Mayor Dunn had previously filed a letter
brief for that purpose. 1 3 The court of appeals, therefore, affirmed the district court's granting of Gannett's motion for summary judgment. "1
The Dunn decision involved questions of state and federal
law. 1 5 Hearing the case under diversity jurisdiction, the Third
Circuit was required to examine the substance of Mayor Dunn's
complaint under New Jersey law while assuring that the court's
decision did not violate the federal constitution's guarantees of
free speech." 6 Mayor Dunn's complaint asserted that El Diario
had published a defamatory statement and a defamatory opinion. 1 17 Alleged defamatory statements are only actionable in
New Jersey if the statement falsely asserts a fact which is reasonably susceptible to defamatory meaning." 8 Section 556 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts has been adopted in New Jersey in de108 Dunn, 833 F.2d at 454 (citing Koch v. Goldway, 817 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1987);
Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 893-94 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062
(1977)).
109 Id. at 454-55 (quoting Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter
Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 286 (1974)).

110 Id. at 455.

111 Id. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). See also supra
notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
112 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
113 Dunn, 833 F.2d at 455.
114 Id.

115 Id. at 449.
116 See id. at 450.
117 Id. at 448.

118 Id. at 449 (citing Karnell v. Campbell, 206 N.J. Super. 81, 501 A.2d 1029
(App. Div. 1985); Kotlikoffv. Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 444 A.2d 1086 (1982)).
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termining whether opinions are subject to liability." 9 The Restatement advises that an opinion cannot be actionable for
defamation unless it asserts undisclosed and defamatory facts.' 2
After adopting the district court's determination that the October 23rd headline was actionable under New Jersey law,' 2 ' the
court focused on whether first amendment protections of free
speech precluded recovery. 122 Using the New York Times actual
malice standard, Judge Aldisert considered Mayor Dunn's assertion that the headline itself evidenced malice by using the word
cerdos. 123 Mayor Dunn's allegations were weighed against El
Diario'srepresentations that numerous sources were relied upon
in formulating the headline which they believed correctly reflected the impact of Mayor Dunn's statement.' 24 The Third Circuit concluded that actual malice could not be derived from the
English translation of a published word. 125 In addition, Judge
Aldisert summarily dismissed Mayor Dunn's complaint as to the
editorial open letter by determining that the facts on which the
126
opinion relied were fully disclosed.

The decision in Dunn comports with the Supreme Court's
protection of free speech which began with the landmark New
York Times decision. Throughout the 1960's, the Supreme Court
enthusiastically expanded the scope of first amendment protections of speech to encompass statements concerning public officials, public figures and public issues. 1 2 The Gertz decision in
1974 restated the Supreme Court's commitment to first amendment protection of speech and publication, while preserving a

private individual's right to pursue a libel suit.128
The Supreme Court has not evidenced an intent to weaken
the first amendment protections of speech which require a public
official or a public figure to establish that the statement was published with actual malice. In fact, the Supreme Court's recent de119

Id. at 452-53.

120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS §

566 (1977).

For the text of § 566 see

supra note 95.
121 Dunn, 833 F.2d at 450.
122 Id.
123 Id.

124 Id. at 451.
125 Id. at 452. The court explicitly stated that "[wie are not willing to base an
actual malice determination solely on the translation to English from Spanish of the
language used by the defendant." Id.
126 Id.

at 454-55.

127 See supra notes 21-45 and accompanying text.
128 See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
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cision in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 129 reaffirms the Court's
commitment to the protection of speech by mandating that a
plaintiff provide clear and convincing evidence of actual malice to
suppress a defendant's motion for summary judgment. 130 The
Anderson decision further assures that spurious defamation suits
3
will be dismissed before they reach trial.' '
Considering the difficulties which confront foreign language
publishers in reporting and translating English dialogue, Dunn
promises to be instrumental in preserving first amendment protections of speech regarding America's foreign speaking citizens.
As an elected public official, Mayor Dunn fits squarely within the
contemplated class of persons addressed by the Supreme Court
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.131 Under New York Times, Mayor
Dunn is required to prove that the publication was issued with
actual malice. 3 3 The basis of Mayor Dunn's complaint was that
El Diario's choice of cerdos was itself malicious. 134 Mayor Dunn,
however, failed to illustrate that there was a more appropriate
Spanish word for litterbug.13 5 Further, El Diario presented a persuasive argument justifying the headline as an accurate reflection
of the frustration and humiliation which was perceived by the au1 6
dience at the campaign debate.
In addition, as Mayor of Elizabeth, New Jersey, Mayor Dunn
had the ability to access the media to present a rebuttal to publications such as El Diario's. Debate on issues concerning elected
137
officials has been of primary importance in prior decisions.
Moreover, foreign language newspapers are an indispensable forum in which to involve foreign speaking citizens in the American
political system. El Diario's publications were politically significant and representative of the editor's viewpoint regarding
Mayor Dunn's capacity as an elected official. 138 America is commonly viewed as a "melting pot" nation where it would seem axiomatic that foreign language publishers are entitled to effective
first amendment protections of speech. Considering New York
129
130

477 U.S. 242 (1986).
Id. at 255-56.

131

Id. at 257.

132

376 U.S. 254, 255-56 (1964).

133

Id. at 280.

See Dunn, 833 F.2d at 450.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 451-52.
137 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280-81 (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 78
Kan. 711, 724, 98 P. 281, 286 (1908)).
138 Dunn, 833 F.2d at 451.
134
135
136
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39
Times use of a subjective standard to determine actual malice,
the decision in Dunn is justified by the necessity of analyzing a
published word in its original language to fully understand the
140
nuances and subtleties intended by the author.

Elizabeth Anne Barba
139 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
140

See Dunn, 833 F.2d at 452.

